First to clear up 2 myths about the scope of the intrusion
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Myth 1: DNA is just a genetic fingerprint. It contains no information other than identification and cannot be used for any alternative purpose. 

Fact: “Unlike fingerprints, which are merely two-dimensional representations of an outward physical marker and are therefore only useful as a form of identification, DNA contains a wealth of information beyond the information that may be used in identifying individuals. To call DNA information a genetic fingerprint trivializes the wealth of information that DNA has already been found to hold” (Cox).

• DNA contains markers such as susceptibility to mental illness, genetic relationships, and predispositions to violence.

 
Myth 2: the database stores information temporarily, or until charges are dropped. At that point, the DNA is removed from the system and can no longer be used for partial or full matches.

​Fact: DNA is never purged from the system, even if the person is later found not guilty, which means DNA is being constantly used to surveil anyone in the database’s actions (Moore). Even after people in the database die or are placed in prison, the information is kept and used to find partial or familial matches, allowing investigators to surveil family members of convicts without a warrant. 

​This is a fourth amendment privacy violation, and "criminal justice experts…worry the nation is becoming a genetic surveillance society” (Moore). Courts have held that criminal acts diminish privacy rights, but the current system takes DNA from those not convicted of crimes. Scalia’s dissent in Maryland v King says, “the decision's scope is  ‘vast’ and ‘scary,’ and DNA collection is an unequivocal violation of Americans' Fourth Amendment right to be free from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ of their bodies and homes” (CRG).

The issue of constitutional rights is more than just the fourth amendment, though. When considering markers within DNA, this wealth of information could lead to genetic discrimination (Williams). Specifically, “analyzing a citizen's DNA sample for genetic markers that indicate a susceptibility to mental illness could impact a citizen's constitutional rights beyond the Fourth Amendment” (Ferrell), such as waiving right to trial or sending a sane citizen to a mental institution.
 
There exists an issue of familial privacy, too. If someone genetically affiliated with you commits a crime, you now have a partial match in the database and can be traced using familial searching. California, Colorado, Maryland, Michigan, Texas, and Virginia use this capability to broaden unwarranted DNA usage (Ferrell). This places "individuals for whom no probable cause has yet existed with respect to any crime" under scrutiny (Cox).

​Another privacy violation is the revelation of “previously unknown genetic connection[s] or…a lack of genetic connection between persons thought to have been related.” Examples would be false paternity and adoption: Y-chromosome markers demonstrate fathers and mitochondrial DNA markers indicate mothers. Clearly, this invades a family’s right to privacy.
 
The final major privacy violation comes in the form of “anonymously” shared infant data and commercially collected data. “Yaniv Ehrlich, a computational biologist…and his colleagues published a paper showing how they discovered the (supposedly hidden) identities of participants in genetic research studies by cross-referencing their data with publicly available information” (Scutti).